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"DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE," "CHANGES," AND
"DILUTION": RECENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
§ 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
I. Introduction
A. Background
The Voting Rights Act was first passed in 1965 after the President and
Congress were prodded into action by the dramatic suppression of would-be
voters in Selma.' The Act, widely hailed as perhaps the most effective piece of
civil rights legislation, was recently extended and expanded for a second time.2
Earlier federal voting rights measures generally proved ineffective, since
they involved lengthy and particularized litigations.3 Southern circumventions
were ingenious and voting rights victories were largely pyrrhic.4 The stringent
measures of the Voting Rights Act have, however, proved strikingly effective.
Between 1964 and 1972 the number of new black registered voters in the South
increased by over one million' and the gap between white and black registra-
tion rates has been reduced from 44.1 percent in 1965 to 11.2 percent in
1972.0 The number of black elected officials in the South has increased from
well under 100 to about 1,000.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires political units covered by the
Act8 to obtain advance approval of any "changes" in their voting arrangements
from the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia.'
1 U. S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 1
(1975) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. Ten days after President Johnson's appeal to
Congress on March 25, 1965, the march from Selma culminated in Montgomery.
2 Voting Rights Act of 1965-Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (Aug. 6,
1975).
3 Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an Extraordinary Federal
Remedy, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 111, 115 (1972).
4 Id. at 114-15.
5 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 41.
6 Id. at 43.
7 Id. at 49.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970). Section 4 is the trigger mechanism for coverage. Covered
jurisdictions are states or other political units that used a voting test or device and had less
than 50 percent turnout in the 1964 or 1968 Presidential election. There is a provision for
exemption if a jurisdiction can show that it has not used a test or device in a discriminatory
manner. Presently covered jurisdictions include Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, and most of North Carolina, as well as scattered counties elsewhere, including
New York's Manhattan, Kings (Brooklyn) and Bronx Counties. COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, 13-16.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). The text of § 5 reads as follows:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibition
set forth in section 1973b(a) [§ 4a] of this title based upon determinations made
under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) [§ 4b] are in effect shall enact or seek
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November
1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the pro-
hibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) [§ 4a] based upon determinations made under
the second sentence of section 1972b(b) [§ 4b] are in effect shall enact or seek to
administer any voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November
1, 1968, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such quali-
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To gain approval the political unit must show that the proposed change has
neither the purpose nor the effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color."" While local federal district courts may decide whether
a new procedure is a "change" subject to § 5, the Attorney General or the
District Court for the District of Columbia must be persuaded that the change
will not abridge voting rights for racial reasons. 1 Some critics contend this re-
quirement reduces the South to tutelage, and argue that the provision un-
constitutionally abridges states' rights to control their voting procedures"; but
the Supreme Court, while conceding that the provision is severe and unusual,"3
has found it constitutional.' 4
Section 5 was rarely used in the first six years after the enactment of the
Voting Rights Act, but in the last several years it has become the Act's most
important provision." Initially, the Justice Department and voters' organiza-
tions were concerned with opening the registration rolls to the minority-group
voters who had been excluded, but with the virtual accomplishment of that
goal," the focus turned to preventing the dilution of the newly established black
voting power. The right to vote means little if states are permitted to devise
voting procedures which effectively discount or "dilute" black votes. Blacks
might vote, but where there is, for example, a white majority and an at-large
voting procedure, black votes could be rendered meaningless by racial bloc
voting. Similarly, district lines could be redrawn or annexations effected that
dilute emerging black political power. Previously, individual constitutional
claims were ineffective in combatting these sophisticated evasions of the fifteenth
amendment, but § 5 of the Voting Rights Act has emerged as an effective
fication, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall
be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualifications, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by
the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within
sixty days after such submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure
to object nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a sub-
sequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined
by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of
Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
10 Id. The language here closely parallels that of the fifteenth amendment, which the Act
is designed to enforce.
11 Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973). "[It is well established that in declara-
tory judgment actions under § 5 the plaintiff has the burden of proof." Id. at 538. For a study
of Attorney General actions under § 5, see Halpin & Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and
Southern State Legislative Re-Districting: Attorney General Determinations under the Voting
Rights Act, 22 J. PUB. L. 37 (1973). The District Court for the District of Columbia has only
rarely been the forum submitting jurisdictions have first turned to.
12 Rice, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Some Dissenting Observations, 15 KAN. L. Rav.
159 (1966).
13 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969).
14 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The 1970 amendments to the
Act were declared constitutional in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
15 COMMISSION REoPRT, supra note 1, at 25; Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right
to Vote, 26 VAND. L. Rav. 523, 576-81 (1973).
16 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, for a progress report.
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antidote, and judicial interpretations have played a major role in bolstering
the effectiveness of § 5.
Allen v. State Board of Elections" determined that § 5 covered all
election changes, even such minor matters as a new polling time or place. 8
Though the inference could have easily been drawn from Allen, it was not
until 1971, in Perkins v. Matthews, 9 that the Supreme Court defined annexa-
tion as a change subject to § 5 scrutiny, and not until 1973, in Georgia v. United
States," that redistricting was similarly considered controlled by § 5. In holding
that Congress meant to reach "the subtle, as well as the obvious state regula-
tions,"2 Allen created a basis for such procedures as multimember districting, at-
large voting, numbered posts, full slate ("antisingleshot") rules, and majority
vote requirements 2 to be considered suspect under § 5.
The Voting Rights Act does not, of course, preclude traditional suits
for voting rights under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Such actions
continue, particularly with regard to redistricting. Moreover, these cases can
at times be instructive for § 5 analysis since the Voting Rights Act was passed
to "enforce the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
and for other purposes."2 The purely constitutional voting rights cases of
recent years shall be considered, however, only to illuminate the concept in both
constitutional and Voting Rights Act traditions.
B. The Concepts and Cases
The courts have only recently begun interpretation of § 5's substantive
provisions. The extent of the section's coverage and the types of racial discrim-
ination forbidden by the section are still being judicially determined. Specific
attention is appropriate for cases containing interpretations of key § 5 concepts:
(1) the proscribed discriminatory "purpose"; (2) "changes," or new voting
procedures covered by § 5; and (3) "dilution," the measure of discriminatory
effect used in § 5 and related constitutional cases. "Purpose" was initially con-
strued in the recent City of Richmond v. United States,2 4 while another case
17 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
18 "Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a
covered state in even a minor way." Id. at 566.
19 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
20 411 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1973). A number of jurisdictions had submitted redistricting
plans before the Georgia holding.
21 393 U.S. at 565. This echoes Justice Frankfurter's often quoted dictum that "the[Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimi-
nation." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). Georgia, 411 U.S. at 533, notes that
Congress has implicitly ratified Allen's broad interpretation of the coverage of § 5.
22 A full-slate requirement forces a voter in an at-large election to vote for as many candi-
dates as there are places to be filled. If there are fewer black candidates than places, blacks will
be forced to vote for some whites. For an explanation of the discriminatory potential of each
of these procedures, see CoMMIssIoN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 204-08.
23 Perhaps the most salient difference is that the burden of proof is shifted by the Voting
Rights Act from the aggrieved voter to the submitting jurisdiction. Voting Rights Act suits are
also heard on the merits in the District Court for the District of Columbia rather than in local
federal courts. The purely constitutional voting rights cases of recent years shall be considered
here only as they help illuminate the concept of "dilution," which is prominent in both constitu-
tional and Voting Rights Act traditions. See note 4 supra.
24 95 S. Ct. 2296 (1975).
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recently argued before the Supreme Court, Beer v. United States," continues the
judicial development of "changes" and "dilution."
Richmond is the Court's fullest treatment of an application of § 5 to the
substance of voting changes. While the opinion is instructive on other facets of
§ 5, its concept of "purpose" is the case's most important feature, especially
since this reading is arguably without statutory support, and could attenuate
§ 5's deterrent effect.
Section 5 was intended to have a "freezing effect" '2 on voting procedures
in covered areas, by forbidding unapproved "changes." Courts have, however,
construed § 5 as applicable in some circumstances to retained or carry-over pro-
cedures as well. To the extent that the concept of "changes" is expanded to
include carry-over procedures as well as procedures directly changed, § 5 will
become a means of reforming entire voting systems rather than merely pro-
hibiting covered states and subdivisions from worsening the status of the black
voter. The courts have taken at least the first steps in this direction.
"Dilution," another important § 5 concept, is still in process of definition.
The courts have frequently used the rubric "dilution" in deciding whether
there has been abridgment of voting power on racial grounds. Particularly, as
the focus of voting rights concern has shifted from denial of the vote to subtler
forms of weakening minority voting power, it has become important to define
standards for judging discriminatory effect. Constitutional guidance has been
offered by the Court,2" and several attempted specifications of the general
constitutional criteria have emerged in recent lower court cases. Prominent
among these measures of undiluted vote is the Beer requirement that, at least
in the context of a history of discrimination, redistricting must give minorities
the power to command proportional representation."
II. Richmond: Discriminatory Purpose and Effect
A. The Background
1. The Case Background
The Supreme Court has considered only three § 5 annexation cases,2"
and Richmond is the Court's first opinion on one of the section's substantive
concepts: proscribed discriminatory purpose. Earlier annexation cases established
the context for Richmond and other § 5 cases: Perkins v. Matthews held that
annexations are covered by § 530 and City of Petersburg v. United States offered
suggestive interpretations of "changes" and "dilution."
The general factual backgrounds of Richmond and Petersburg are similar.
Both Virginia cities sought to annex parts of adjacent counties. In both cases
25 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974). Argued last term, Beer has been set for reargument.
95 S. Ct. 1672 (1975).
26 Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973).
27 See text accompanying notes 86-92 infra.
28 See text accompanying notes 93-97 infra.
29 City of Richmond v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 2296 (1975); City of Petersburg v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973). See Perkins v. Matthews,
400 U.S. 379 (1971).
30 400 U.S. at 390.
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there was a black population majority in the original city, a white majority in the
enlarged city and, at the outset, an at-large system of election. Both cities had
a history of bloc voting and racial discrimination. The cases differ importantly,
however, since in Petersburg there was no evidence or finding of a discriminatory
purpose in the annexation."
In Petersburg the Supreme Court affirmed without comment the lower
court's ruling that "this annexation can be approved only on the condition that
modifications calculated to neutralize to the extent possible any adverse effect
upon the political participation of black voters are adopted... ."" The annexa-
tion would be acceptable only if the carry-over, at-large procedure was changed
to a ward system of election. To mitigate the dilutive effect of annexation, the
court actually required alteration not of a "change," but a carry-over procedure.
The Petersburg court also determined that showing a lack of discriminatory
effect would be "a heavy burden for a community in a state with Virginia's
history of past racial discrimination.""
Perkins and Petersburg set the stage for Richmond and other recent § 5
cases, then, by bringing annexations within § 5, by suggesting a broad con-
struction of "changes," and by requiring "modifications calculated to neutralize"
dilutive changes. The Richmond Court works out of this context and breaks
new ground in its interpretation of the discriminatory "purpose" forbidden
by § 5. This interpretation, as well as the Court's finding of no discriminatory
effect, are worthy of careful critical attention as they shed initial light on what
the Court will consider to be forbidden by § 5.
2. The Factual Background
The city of Richmond began annexation suits against two counties in
1962. At that time, black voters were not a significant political force and the
purpose of the suits was not racially tainted." One of the annexation actions
proved too costly to continue, and the other was pursued only desultorily until
1968. By that time, blacks had emerged as a strong political power and were be-
coming a population majority in Richmond. With the 1970 city council
elections imminent, the city agreed in 1969 to a compromise annexation, which
reduced the percentage of the black population from 52 percent to 42 percent.
Perkins had not yet been decided, and the 1969 compromise was not submitted
for preclearance. 5 Elections were held in the enlarged city in 1970-elections
which, in the light of the Perkins inclusion of annexations within § 5, were
illegal-and subsequent elections have been enjoined pending the outcome of
this suit. After Petersburg allowed an annexation only on condition of changing
from an at-large to a ward system, the city amended its election plan accord-
ingly." The Attorney General then accepted the annexation and revised
31 354 F. Supp. at 1024.
32 Id. at 1031 (emphasis added). Petersburg could not be fairly read to imply that any
annexation without discriminatory purpose could be purified of wrongful racial effect by use of
a ward system.
33 Id. at 1027.
34 Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093, 1097 (4th Cir. 1972).35 It was reasonably clear by this time that annexations were subject to § 5 and other citieshad submitted them prior to Perkins.
36 95 S. Ct. at 2301.
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election plan.3" He and the city then presented the plan to the District Court
for the District of Columbia, which sought the assistance of a Special Master.
The District Court, accepting the Master's findings that the city had not
proven that the changes did not have discriminatory purpose and effect, refused
to approve the annexation."8 During this time, there was also a fifteenth amend-
ment suit, Holt v. Richmond,9 filed and later appealed, which sought to have
the annexation dissolved.
B. Discriminatory Purpose
On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted the findings of the Master that
the compromise annexation
was infected by the impermissible purpose of denying the right to vote based
on race through perpetuating white majority power to exclude Negroes
from office through at-large elections .... 40
Having added the qualification "through at-large elections," the Court appar-
ently accepted a finding of discriminatory purpose only insofar as the annexation
paralleled the Petersburg expansion of an at-large system. It did not seem to
accept that the entire 1969 annexation was infected with discriminatory purpose.
Why the particular device used should dictate the finding of discriminatory
purpose is unclear. Apparently removal of an at-large method legitimated the
city's purpose.
The Court's ambiguous acceptance of the Master's finding of impermissible
purpose was followed by a skeptical commentary on his methods4 and a con-
clusion that "the controlling factor in this case is whether there are now objec-
tively verifiable, legitimate reasons for the annexation." '4 2 Even if the Court had
found a clearly invidious intent in the 1969 compromise, that intent would not, in
the Court's view, have amounted to the discriminatory purpose forbidden by § 5,
if presently nonracial justifications for the annexation exist. The Court did not
explain or attempt to justify this shift in temporal focus. Instead, the Court
juxtaposed its interpretation of purpose with references to the lack of racial
motive in 1962, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Holt that plaintiffs had not shown
unlawful purpose in 1969, and the apparent inevitability of some annexation by
Richmond." The case is presently before the district court on remand for con-
sideration of whether there are now legitimate reasons for annexation.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 2302. The court did not, however, agree with the Master's remedial recommenda-
tion of deannexation.
39 334 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 931 (1972). The present suit was submitted in the form of a consent judgment to the
District Court for the District of Columbia, 376 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1974).
40 95 S. Ct. at 2305 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 2306-07. The Court specifically suspected that the.Master may have relied too
much on the testimony of an interested witness. But besides the verbal evidence showingimpermissible intent there were objective correlatives: the character of the annexed area sorted
badly with the city's need for space, as it was relatively developed and populous; the city
planning official was not even consulted about the compromise. Cf. 459 F.2d at 1093, 1105-06,
1109 and 376 F. Supp. at 1353.
42 95 S. Ct. at 2306 (emphasis added).
43 Id. at 2306-07.
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This construction of the Act is subject to several criticisms. As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent, such a reading "wholly negates the prophy-
lactic purpose of § 5." 44 The deterrent effect of § 5 is established as important,"
but the Court's holding seems to allow unjustifiable discriminatory maneuvers
on the chance that justifications will be available years later. Under Richmond,
a city's intent at the time of annexation is irrelevant; instead the Court is willing
to entertain a city's nonracial explanation six or seven years after annexation."'
The Court's allowance of after-the-fact justification is unacceptable on
other grounds. "Purposes" should not be narrowly equated with "reasons." The
Court remanded for decision on whether there are in 1975 acceptable reasons
or justifications for annexation. But even were there nonracial justifications
that could have been adduced in 1969, if the intent of the city was to dilute
the black vote, then arguably its purpose was infected. Masking of imper-
missible purpose with facially valid reasons should not be tolerated, especially
since Congress has mandated inquiry into purpose as well as effect. Yet the
Court's holding here eviscerates the first of those mandates."'
Further, the Court's reference to the inevitability of annexation, and the
nonracial purposes of the much larger 1962 proposal, is not germane, as was
noted by Justice Brennan: "Annexation in the abstract, however, is not at issue
here; the critical question is whether the particular line drawn in 1969 had any
contemporary justification.""8I Finally, the Court's reliance on the Fourth Circuit's holding of lack of dis-
criminatory purpose in Holt is misplaced. That case was not within the
Voting Rights Act and therefore the plaintiff had to shoulder the heavy burden
of proving discriminatory purpose. That burden became impossible to carry
when the Holt court found all evidence of wrongful motive simply irrelevant. 9
In Richmond, a § 5 case, the burden shifted to the city, but the Court lightened
it by finding irrelevant any illicit purposes at the time of the change. Indeed,
Richmond inverted the Petersburg determination that a city in a state with
Virginia's past has a heavy burden to show a lack of discrimination; a Southern
city now can prove the absence of discriminatory purpose by discovering non-
racial reasons for annexation.
44 Id. at 2310.
45 See Co bisSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-31; Derfner, supra note 15, at 580-81.
46.. This apparent crippling of the statute may be somewhat mitigated by the preclearanceprovision. In Richmond, the annexation went into effect without proof of lack of racial purpose,but, at least with regard to annexation, this would presumably not happen again since Perkins
would now clearly force cities to seek preclearance.
47 The Court, by remanding, implicitly recognized this distinction between "reasons" and
"purpose." It stated, 95 S. Ct. at 2307, that a change could have no discriminatory effect, but
be still forbidden by § 5's proscriptions against racial purposes. But if the effect were non-
discriminatory, presumably "reasons" would be readily at hand. Of course, the chances offinding a racist purpose after a holding of no racist effect would be slim, as it would imply in
effect that the racists were bumblers. See Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975), for
the converse: "the lack of racial motivation is at least some evidence of a lack of discriminatory
effect." Id. at 633.
48 95 S. Ct. at 2311 n.14. "Contemporary" here refers to 1969.
49 459 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (4th Cir. 1972). Judge Haynsworth, writing for the Fourth
Circuit, evinced the very narrow opinion that motive is relevant only when there is the type of
egregious discrimination found in GomiUion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion,
the City of Tuskegee had attempted to reshape its boundaries in order to exclude all but four
of its black citizens. For a comment on Judge Haynsworth's view and a discussion of the recent
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C. Discriminatory Effect
The Court's consideration of discriminatory effect stands on firmer, if
not unassailable, ground:
We are also convinced that the annexation now before us, in the context
of the ward system of election finally proposed by the city . . . does not
have the effect prohibited by § 5.50
The earlier Petersburg case required "modifications calculated to neutralize
(dilution) to the extent possible." The Richmond Court found that, as in
Petersburg, conversion from an at-large system to a ward plan meets this
requirement. The Master reached an opposite conclusion because a black
organization had presented a plan calculated to give black voters a better
opportunity to control the swing ward. 1
The ward plan presented by Richmond did not address racial distribution
as a factor.2 Such "color-blind" action is normally desirable, but where it is
necessary to "calculate to neutralize" racial dilution, then a color-conscious
remedy ought to be required. Although the shift from an at-large to a ward
system was an acceptable calculation in Petersburg, it is a wooden reading
of that case to infer that such a conversion will always be a sufficient calculation.
This is especially so where there is also evidence of racial purpose, as in Rich-
mond. The "fairly designed ward plan" required by the Court does "afford
[blacks] representation reasonably equivalent to the political strength in the
enlarged community,"" but the alternatives suggested by the lower court in
Holt5 and the plan of the black organization seem better "calculated to neutral-
ize" the dilution of black voting power from its strength in the city before
annexation. The Court, once approving the requirement of such calculations
in Petersburg, concentrated on the racial proportions in the enlarged city rather
than requiring equitable and imaginative measures to preserve the black voting
power in the original city.
The overall effect of the various court proceedings in the Richmond dispute
is that the apparent purpose of the compromise annexation of 1969, the dilution
of black voting power, has been accomplished. While the Voting Rights Act
intended that unless there was a showing of nondiscrimination, the 1964 voting
procedures would remain unchanged, the Court's decision leaves in effect the
illegal election of 1970 and the achievement of racist purpose in 1969.
constitutional controversy over inquiry into legislative motive, see Note, Municipal Boundary
Changes and the Fifth Amendment, 51 N. CAR. L. REv. 573, 578-81 (1973). This controversy
can easily be sidestepped in § 5 analysis, as the Congress there requires scrutiny of intent.
50 95 S. Ct. at 2304.
51 The plan approved by the Court had four predominantly black and four predominantly
white districts, with blacks comprising 40.9 percent of the other ward; the alternate plan
would have given blacks 59 percent of the population in the swing ward, probably about half
the registered voters. The District Court for the District of Columbia held that Richmond's
racist history and purposes required it to eliminate the dilutive effects of annexations. 376
F. Supp. at 1353.
52 City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1357 (D.D.C. 1974).
53 95 S. Ct. at 2304 (emphasis added).
54 334 F. Supp. at 240. The court would have had the old city elect seven councilmen and
the annexed area elect the other two.
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Richmond is the Supreme Court's first holding on the meaning of the
discriminatory purpose proscribed by § 5. It is indulgent to a fault in allowing
cities to later justify their suspect motives. The statutory language requiring the
submitting jurisdiction to show that its voting change has neither discriminatory
purpose nor discriminatory effect" is clear. It provides no support for the
Court's construction of "purpose" as ex post facto explanation. The Court's
reading of discriminatory effect is more tenable, though it inadequately provides
the safeguard for existing minority voting power that § 5 seeks as a minimum.
III. Changed and Carry-over Voting Procedures
Section 5 explicitly forbids unapproved changes in voting procedures, but
appears to offer no direct avenue for reaching retained, or carry-over, procedures
which have discriminatory purpose or effect. 6 Several recent cases suggest, how-
ever, a wedge by which retained procedures may also be subject to § 5 examina-
tion. If § 5 is construed broadly to cover carry-over provisions as well as novel
features, the section could effect a general reformation of voting procedures in
covered areas. Carry-over procedures were first brought within § 5 in the
Petersburg annexation case by viewing a new procedure and a carry-over pro-
cedure as a single entity.
A. Petersburg
The city in Petersburg submitted for approval an annexation plan that
retained an at-large voting system.17 The District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected the plan, as had the Attorney General, but offered approval
on condition that the at-large system be transformed into a ward system. The
court called the rejected plan "an expansion of an at-large voting system" and
found that "the expansion . . . is a change. 58 The Attorney General's office
spoke of "readopting the at-large election system," and continued, "in the par-
ticular context of Petersburg we are unable to conclude that the at-large feature
will not have a discriminatory effect on voting rights."5 " Section 5 proscribes
changes which have a discriminatory effect, but here the effect of a retained
feature, in the context of change, is subjected to scrutiny.
This analysis indicates that the new feature (the annexation) is not by
itself objectionable, and the old feature (at-large voting) is not by itself subject
to § 5, but the total effect of the combined features receives § 5 scrutiny, in the
context of a shift from a black population majority to white. Considering the
old and new together is arguably in the spirit of § 5, because it is clear that in
tandem with the annexation, the at-large voting procedure takes on a new
55 See note 4 supra.
56 Id.
57 See discussion accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
58 354 F. Supp. at 1029.
59 Id. at 1023 (emphasis added). Since Georgia, this is all that the Attorney General or
the District Court for the District of Columbia need conclude, viz., that the political unit has
not carried its burden of showing lack of discriminatory effect. For a contrasting conclusion,
see Beer, infra note 102.
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cast and weakens the power of the black vote. If the "freezing effect" of § 5
is to have meaning, a change cannot be scrutinized in isolation without concern
for its interaction with retained procedures. The Richmond Court displayed a
realistic appreciation of the thrust of § 5 when it affirmed the Petersburg court's
conditioning of approval on a change to a ward system.6"
B. Georgia
Georgia v. United States 6 suggests a broader use of § 5, in the context of
a redistricting change, to effect a reform of carry-over procedures. In Georgia
the interaction between the novel and retained procedures is not as clear as in
Petersburg. The redistricting change seems more nearly the occasion for
examining carry-over practices. If this tendency were extended, periodically re-
quired redistricting could bring every voting practice under § 5 scrutiny.
In Georgia, the state submitted to the Attorney General two reapportion-
ment plans for the state House of Representatives. Both were rejected, because of
the "combination of multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority
(runoff) requirement."62 Even though the second plan apparently reduced the
number of multimember districts below the 1964 figure and even though "multi-
member districts, numbered posts and a majority runoff requirement were
features of Georgia election law prior to November 1, 1964," § 5 applies
if that section of the Act reaches the substance of those changes. Section 5
is not concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures, but rather
with the reality of changed practices as they affect Negro voters.62
Georgia's reapportionment plan provided an occasion for a more general
investigation of the racial effects of its voting procedures. Apparently, even
those features which are not new and which do not take on a new cast (as had
the at-large system with a different racial majority in Petersburg) can be found
objectionable under § 5. If this reading is adopted, it would mean that the
reapportionment that is mandated periodically by law will, in areas covered by
the Voting Rights Act, provide an opportunity for wholesale reformation of
voting practices, old and new.64
C. Beer
The suggestive reading of § 5 "changes" in Georgia was extended in Beer v.
60 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
61 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
62 Id. at 530 n.22.
63 Id. at 531.
64 The Court's holding in Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), legitimatized the
escape of Mississippi and later Alabama from § 5 coverage of their redistricting. By simply
not formulating acceptable redistricting plans, these states surrendered redistricting authority
to the local federal district courts. The Court held that the plans of such courts do not fall
under § 5, though they are subject to review in the Supreme Court. The Connor Court re-
quired amendment of the district court's plan so as to eliminate multimember districts, and
also expressed its preference for single-member districts. These determinations were within
the Court's supervisory power. For a review of more recent history on these matters, see
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 211-14, 239-41.
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United States.65 In this holding by the District Court for the District of Columbia,
every feature of the New Orleans system of electing city councilmen was weighed
in considering the acceptability of a redistricting plan. The carry-over of an at-
large system of electing two of the seven council members received special atten-
tion.
Having twice unsuccessfully sought approval of redistricting plans from the
Attorney General, New Orleans sought a declaratory judgment from the district
court.66 In the New Orleans plan there were new district lines and a number of
suspect procedures were retained, including a majority vote requirement and an
at-large requirement.67 The Attorney General had objected only to the district
lines and had not mentioned the noxious carry-over elements.6" The court none-
theless considered all of these elements in judging the legitimacy of the district
lines and gave special attention to the at-large feature.69 The city contended that
the at-large procedure was not subject to § 5, since it had been used since 1954
and because it was unaffected by the redrawing of ward lines for the other five
council seats."0 The court responded that the redistricting plan was not to be
judged in a vacuum, but as part of the whole election machinery: "The plan, to
merit judicial approbation, must survive not only the restrictions on black voting
which it alone imposes but also those which jointly with extrinsic phenomena it
makes possible." '71
This view echoes those considered above in Petersburg and Georgia.
Beer's understanding of changes, however, goes a step beyond its predeces-
sors, by suggesting a normative dimension of changes. This more expansive view
is dictated in part by other dynamics of the Beer analysis which have no counter-
part in Petersburg and Georgia. The opinion has a strong constitutional colora-
tion, and constitutional analysis obviously extends beyond § 5 "changes." 72 Beer's
concept of "dilution" is constitutionally based and tends to subtly refocus the § 5
view of changes. An adumbration of Beer's analysis of "dilution" reveals a shifting
of perspective from the "before" and "after," central to § 5, toward a non-
temporal ideal of fair voting arrangements.
When the Beer court used "change words," such as "diminish," "weaken,"
and "reduce," it was often not referring to the differences between current and
proposed practices or effects. Instead, it was speaking of the difference between
"natural" black voting strength, calculated as percentages of the city's population
or registered voters, and the percentage of councilmen which the proposed plan
and carry-over procedures would give blacks the power to elect. Thus,
65 374 F. Supp. 363 (1974).
66 374 F. Supp. at 367, 369-70.
67 Id. at 368.
68 Id. at 370 n.33.
69 Id. at 399-400.
70 Id. Whether § 5 was properly applicable to the at-large feature was one of the "questions
presented" to the Supreme Court when Beer was argued on March 25, 1975. The other issue
was whether the court used improper criteria and standards in evaluating the effect of the plan.
43 U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. July 9, 1975). The case was not decided last term and has been
restored to the calendar, 95 S. Ct. 1672 (1975).
71 374 F. Supp. at 400.
72 For example in Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1975), the holding of
the lower court of voting discrimination was constitutionally based, but there was no triggering
"change," as there must be in § 5.
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in determining whether the plan would diminish the black-vote potential
endowed by a large black population, we similarly included the at-large
seats in the computation.7 3
The at-large mechanism is tested because it tends to diminish or change the
potency of the black vote from what it might have been, not in 1964 or pre-
redistricting, but "normally." When the court spoke of the black vote as it "now
is," it meant the "theoretical optimum designed to give fair representation to
both minority and majority groups." '74 "Before" and "after" in the court's usage
had more than simple temporal meaning, and so the "changes" coming within
§ 5 are impliedly deviations from a norm rather than differences from past
practice.
Justice Brennan perhaps wrote too narrowly in Richmond of "what I take
to be the fundamental objective of § 5, namely, the protection of present levels
of voting effectiveness for the black population."7 " In Petersburg, in Georgia, and
especially in Beer the ideal is not limited to the preservative function of § 5;
§ 5 also becomes a wedge for reaching even pre-1964 practices that give less than
fair or proportional representation to blacks.
Section 5 centers on procedures different from those in effect in 19646 and
requires that such different procedures be shown to be free of discriminatory
purpose and effect. Insofar as the purposes and effects of these changes cannot
be isolated from carry-over procedures it is only judicial realism to give § 5
scrutiny to the related procedures. Thus Petersburg tied a carry-over procedure
to a change because the old feature would otherwise have new and dilutive
effects. Georgia held that § 5 is concerned with the effect of changed practices
in the context of the whole voting system, including carry-over procedures. Beer,
however, is animated by constitutional considerations and adds a strong norma-
tive and nontemporal dimension to the concept of changes. This addition is
incongruous in light of the strong temporal cast of § 5, and can only be recon-
ciled if it is permissible to apply constitutional categories to § 5. This question
is confronted more directly in the discussion of "dilution" and Beer's methods."
IV. "Dilution" and Beer v. United States
As concern has shifted from preventing denial of the vote to prohibiting its
dilution on racial grounds," it has become necessary to determine what consti-
tutes dilution. Correlatively, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out: "One cannot
speak of 'debasement' or 'dilution' of the value of a vote until there is first defined
a standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth."7 " Determining the
value of an undiluted vote is crucial in screening changed voting procedures for
the discriminatory effect proscribed by § 5. Although the meaning and standards
73 374 F. Supp. at 399 (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 388, quoting Dobson v. Mayor & City Council, 330 F. Supp. 1290, 1299 (D. Md.
1971).
75 95 S. Ct. at 2312 (emphasis in original).
76 See note 4 supra.
77 See note 98 infra.
78 Derfner, supra note 15, at 524.
79 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962).
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for dilution are not settled, broadly it means, in a racial context, that
species of discriminatory effect by which minority votes have less than full weight.
The recent § 5 Court case, Beer v. United States,"0 and other constitutional cases
have proposed measures for this full weight in the context of redistricting.
While § 5 offers unique coverage of "changes" in voting practices, the con-
cept of "dilution" has a constitutional history that is longer and broader than its
usage in § 5 cases. Section 5 cases have not construed the meaning of "dilution"
rigorously or with constitutional resonance."1 Although Beer is formally a § 5 case,
its analysis is often indistinguishable from that of purely constitutional redis-
tricting cases. This constitutional tradition must be discussed to understand Beer
and compare its proposed standard for the undiluted vote of "power to command
racial proportionality""2 with the available alternatives.
A. The Constitutional Background
Twenty-five years ago the Court first recognized the right to an undiluted
vote:
The right to vote includes the right to have the ballot counted.... It also
includes the right to have the vote counted at full value without dilution
or discount .... That federally protected right suffers substantial dilution
. . . [where a] favored group has full voting strength . . . [and] [tihe
groups not in favor have their votes discounted.,s
Justice Warren echoed these thoughts in the "one man, one vote" decision,
Reynolds v. Sims,"4 a fourteenth amendment, equal protection case: "And the
right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." The Court's decisions in Allen and Perkins transformed § 5 into the
most important section of the Voting Rights Act. In holding that the Act reached
every type of election change, both opinions accepted that "Congress intended
to adopt the concept of voting articulated in Reynolds v. Sims and protect
Negroes against a dilution of their voting power." 5 The Court thereby recognized
the effect on § 5 of a constitutional tradition regarding dilution. That tradition
has continued to develop and bear on § 5, especially in two important redis-
tricting cases, Whitcomb v. Chavis8 and White v. Regester"
80 374 F. Supp. 363 '(D.D.C. 1974).
81 'Dilution" has been used in § 5 cases in at least three senses: (1) as a merely statistical
event, Holt v. Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228, 232 (E.D. Va. 1971); (2) normatively, as a species
of abridgment, 374 F. Supp. at 387; and (3) in an intermediate sense, as something to be
offset, 354 F. Supp. at 1031. These different meanings account for the sharp difference of
interpretation of Perkins in Richmond between Justice Brennan and the majority. 95 S. Ct. at
2302-03, 2311.
82 "In determining the impact of a redistricting plan upon the voting capability of a
racial minority, the relevant comparison is between the results which the minority is constitu-
tionally free to command and the results which the plan leaves the minority able to achieve.
A substantial difference between the two is unconstitutionally enervating." 374 F. Supp. at 388.
83 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950).
84 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
85 393 U.S. at 588 (Justice Harlan's disapproving but accurate reading).
86 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
87 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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Whitcomb v. Chavis was a watershed for establishing standards for finding
racially discriminatory effect in redistricting cases. In Whitcomb, black plaintiffs
contended that the Marion County, Indiana, system of electing state legislators
operated to dilute the black vote.8 The county's legislators were all chosen in
multimember districts and blacks were rarely elected. The Court "insisted that
the challenger carry the burden of proving that multimember districts unconstitu-
tionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or political ele-
ments," and recalled that it had "not yet sustained such an attack. 9 Whitcomb
compels a plaintiff to go beyond a showing that the district lines and voting
procedures produced a dearth of minority representatives, and requires that he
show that the political process itself was not equally open to minorities or that
those elected were in fact not representing their constituents' interests.9"
For several years no plaintiff could carry this onerous burden of showing
less than "equal access to the political process" or "reverse legislative outcome."
Finally, in White v. Regester this "equality of access" test was applied in the
totality of the circumstances to show that multimember districting was discrimina-
tory. The circumstances in White included a history of racial discrimination and
bloc voting, a paucity of elected minority representatives, and suspect election
procedures." The Court found that multimember districts, while not per se
unconstitutional, were being used "invidiously to cancel out or minimize the
voting strength of racial groups."92
B. Beer v. United States
Though Beer was a § 5 case, its finding of dilution is heavily colored by this
application of the Whitcomb test in White. Beer attempted to meld the approach
of a § 5 case with the tradition of constitutional redistricting cases. Beer tran-
scended its constitutional predecessors, Whitcomb and White, factually, as it
dealt not only with the validity of multimember districts but also with the
particular lines drawn for single-member districts.
Beer's standard for dilution is simple and firm. When redistricting results
in racially nonproportional districts--blacks having less than the power to
command a proportion of representatives equal to the ratio of the black popula-
tion-this constitutes the dilution and abridgment forbidden by § 5 and the
fifteenth amendment.
Dilution-a species of abridgment-of the right to vote is necessarily
gauged by the difference between the value-the weight-which the
vote should have and the value which in the particular circumstances it
really has.93
88 403 U.S. at 128-29.
89 Id. at 144.
90 Id. at 149-50, 155.
91 412 U.S. at 766-67. All of these circumstances are also present in Beer and presumably
would obtain in many § 5 actions.
92 Id. at 765.
93 374 F. Supp. at 387.
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Beer answered the implicit questions of what value the vote should have, and
for whom. Its weight, given a history of bloc voting, is the power a racial group
has to control the election in a district, and its proper measure can be determined
by taldng the percentage of the population (or perhaps of the registered voters)94
which the minority comprises and comparing it with the percentage of council
seats that could be controlled. This "power to command proportionality" test
is at least arguably not the same as the test of proportional representation rejected
in Whitcomb and White."5 That rejected test concentrates on proportions in fact
elected as an improper index of the undiluted vote, while the Beer proposal
emphasizes the power to command rather than the result actually commanded.
When, however, the totality of the circumstances includes, as it did in Beer, a
history of discrimination, the distinction between potential and result tends to
evaporate:
the practice of bloc voting along racial lines which so frequently per-
vades elections in New Orleans would expectably bring the black and white
voting potentials fairly close to reality.0
In any case, Beer clearly applied the "power to command" test literally as the
primary basis for deciding the permissibility of a redistricting plan:
Based upon voter registration, black voting strength is 34.5% of total
voting strength in New Orleans. With seven members to be nominated or
elected at councilmanic elections, the power of the black vote is theoretically
equivalent to 2.42 seats on the Council.... It cannot be doubted that the
reduction in the strength of the black vote from its natural potential of
2.42 seats to an actual equivalent of a dubious one seat is a dilution in eve.ry
sense of the word.9 7
Beer impliedly holds that § 5 requires affected areas to redistrict in a color-
-conscious way so as to ensure voting power to black voters in proportion to their
numbers.
The "power to command proportionality" test developed in Beer appears as
a constitutional conclusion which has no obvious limitation to § 5 cases. The
expansiveness of this conclusion promises breadth of application, but arguably
compromises Beer's § 5 basis.98 Whatever the propriety of Beers constitutional
94 Id. at 388-93, 393-99. The court applies both, using headings of "present?' (registered
voters) and "natural" (population) black voting strength. The different standards here
produce the same result.
95 "Nor does the fact that the number of ghetto residents who were legislators was not in
proportion to ghetto population satisfactorily prove invidious discrimination absent evidence and
findings that ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other Marion County residents to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." 403 U.S. at 149
(emphasis added). The rejection of the proportionality test is qualified by what other evidence
can be adduced; so evidence of lack of proportionality, while never conclusive by itself would
-be relevant in some circumstances. 412 U.S. at 765-66.
96 374 F. Supp. at 389.
97 Id. at 388-89 (emphasis added).
98 The court recognized that it has authority to hear only § 5, id. at 400, but for
guidance as to what constitutes the abridgment forbidden by § 5, it looks to the "theory and
practice prevalent in legislative [constitutional] reapportionment cases, wherein essentially the
same problem has arisen," id. at 383. In this constitutional tradition the court finds an "instruc-
tive methodology" and the standard general test for "equality of access," id. at 384. This test
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methods, they aid comparison of Beer's "power to command proportionality" test
with tests developed in recent constitutional redistricting cases.
C. Alternate Standards for the Undiluted Vote
The Beer court has not been alone in attempting to apply and specify the
Whitcomb-White test for racial dilution in redistricting. Alternate standards for
an undiluted vote have appeared in the recent constitutional voting rights cases,
United Jewish Organizations v. Wilson9 and Wallace v. House.00
United Jewish Organizations began as a submission of redistricting plans to
the Attorney General under the Voting Rights Act, but the suit developed into a
traditional constitutional action under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
White voters claimed that their rights had been abridged when, in order to secure
the Attorney General's approval under § 5, the New York Legislature replanned
several districts to increase already existing nonwhite population majorities. The
court rejected the claim of the white voters, finding that the new lines were
justifiable as "correctives."'' This court-allowed remedy of increasing nonwhite
control beyond majority to a "safe" level indicates that a liberal standard for
"cproper" minority voting strength is appropriate.
However, the United Jewish Organizations "safety" level standard is perhaps
too idiosyncratic in nature for purposes of comparison with other measures of
the undiluted vote. The standard was allowed by the court rather than required,
and the court sought to ensure its constitutional acceptability by calling it a
remedy. These limiting characteristics can be discounted to a degree because the
"safe" districting did in a sense result from § 5 by the Attorney General's refusal
to approve other plans, and there seems to be nothing intrinsically remedial in
the standard's use." 2 Whatever its limits, the United Jewish Organizations safety
test is significant as an outpost beyond Beer's proportionality standard.
Beer's proportionality test for determining undiluted votes was explicitly re-
is to be applied in the totality of the circumstances as Beer brings the constitutional tradition of
Whitcomb and White into a § 5 context. If this procedure is appropriate, it might be asked
how a § 5 case differs from a traditional constitutional action. Beer is a § 5 redistricting case
and it would be unwise to pretend either that § 5 is unrelated to the fifteenth amendment or
that there is no constitutional redistricing tradition. The Beer court, however, too greatly
subjected the § 5 character to the constitutional dimension. Awkwardness results. The court, for
example, recognized, id. at 392-93, that by § 5 the burden of proof belongs to the city, not to
aggrieved voters, but made little of this significant fact. The court did assign to the city the
burden that would have been borne by aggrieved voters in a constitutional action, but this
simple inversion takes no account of such special § 5 traits as proscription of discriminatory
purpose. The court's less than deft handling of the burden is evident in its concluding, id. at
393, affirmatively that the plan's effect is discriminatory, when it need have concluded only
that the city failed to show lack of dilutive effect. Finally, since constitutional analysis needs
no triggering "change," the temporal focus so important to § 5 is slighted. There is, then, an
imperfect fit when the District Court for the District of Columbia treats a § 5 case as if it
were a constitutional suit. Section 5 will perhaps be less ponderous and more effective if a style
is developed which both recognizes the section's constitutional relatives and takes account of the
singularities of the statute.
99 510 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
100 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975). The plaintiff is a black man named George Wallace, Sr.
101 Of course greater latitude has been allowed by courts when measures are remedial.
102 The dissent makes this point vigorously, 510 F.2d at 529. The court speaks of correcting
an invidious discrimination, id. at 525, but as the rejected district lines were never implemented
for lack of approval from the Attorney General, it is not clear exactly what is corrected or how.
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jected in a recent Fifth Circuit redistricting case, Wallace v. House."'3 There the
court adopted only a "fundamental fairness" specification of the Whitcomb test.
In Wallace, a small Louisiana town had an at-large system of electing city
councilmen which had been found unconstitutional by a lower court." 4 In the
town there was a black population majority, but a slim white voting majority
which regularly returned all-white councils. Under a district court order the
town developed alternate arrangements and adopted one which created two
black wards, two white wards, and left one council seat to be filled by at-large
voting.'0 5 The Circuit court found that this plan did not unconstitutionally dilute
the black vote and held that the district court should have deferred to legislative
preference for this plan rather than adopt the alternate, single-member plan. 8
The pertinence of Wallace is its standard for the undiluted vote. Like all
cases in this constitutional lineage, Wallace used the "equality of access" barom-
eter of dilution developed in Whitcomb and White and applied through the
"totality of the circumstances."'07 But while Beer was willing to specify that this
general test in a Southern context meant the power to command proportional
representation, Wallace shied from such an interpretation:
Multi-member districts thus pose a problem of degree of fair representation
-"fair" not in the sense either of "considerable" or of "proportionate,"
but rather in a general sense of equity . . . the dilution doctrine [is] an
intensely practical, factually-oriented rule against fundamental unfairness.'"
The Wallace court spoke more particularly at one point, recognizing that blacks
will now control two of five seats in the council,
a share only slightly lower than the proportion of black voters in the entire
electorate; such representation will give blacks that access to the political
process which was denied to them under the all-at-large plans .... 109
While this approximates the language of Beer as a test of equality of access, the
Wallace holding actually develops a more general test: "The Constitution, how-
ever, demands not racial representation by ratio but racial equity in the political
process."" 0
This trio of cases with their suggestions of proper standards for measuring
the undiluted black vote are in some ways different and not easily compared.
103 515 F.2d at 629.
104 Id. at 622.
105 Id. at 625.
106 Id. at 638. The legislative body whose plan receives deference from the circuit court is
the same one that had perpetuated and defended the obviously and later admitted racist prior
arrangements. Although the court found and excoriates the racism and unrepresentativeness of
earlier city councils, and referred to the Supreme Court as having "meant that to give a black
voter a choice of voting for one of three white candidates who know nothing and care less
about his or her interests is to render the vote nugatory . . . ," id. at 629, it concludes its
application of the "intensely practical" dilution doctrine by saying, "We are not prepared to
presume... that no white person in Ferriday can fairly represent a black person." Id. at 638.
107 Id. at 628-29.
108 Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 638.
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United Jewish Organizations spoke of what may be allowed as a measure of
proper minority voting strength, while the others speak of requirements. Beer
alone was a § 5 case, although the related constitutional considerations weighed
heavily in the opinion. In spite of these differing contexts, three distinct standards
for measuring the undiluted black vote emerge. Wallace was an unimaginative
application or specification of the Whitcomb-White tradition, and offers only a
test of fundamental fairness. Beer, on the other hand, held that where there is
a history of discrimination, anything less than a power to command proportional
representation of racial lines is constitutionally impermissible. Finally, United
Jewish Organizations allowed redistricting that increases black voting power by
creating "safe" districts as a remedy.
The Supreme Court's rejection in Whitcomb and White of proportional
results makes it unlikely that Beer's "power to command proportionality" test
would be acceptable as a general rule or that United Jewish Organizations would
be adopted except as a remedy. The Court's giving weight to a discriminatory
history in White suggests, however, that the Beer test has a better chance of
winning acceptability in a Southern context. If dilution is to be an "intensely
practical doctrine" as the Wallace court maintained, specification of the Whit-
comb-White equality of access test is needed, especially where a continuing
history of discrimination can be masked by outward forms of equality. A newly
found "fundamental fairness" will not suffice. Beer does not suffer from a similar
lack of specificity. As a constitutional requirement, even in a Southern context,
Beer's "power to command" test may verge too closely to the proportional results
test already rejected by the Court. As a § 5 standard, with the submitting jurs-
diction bearing the burden of showing that its district lines and voting procedures
do not dilute the vote, the Beer test ought to be more readily accepted.
V. Conclusion
Judicial interpretations of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act have been notably
scanty. The section was of minor importance for several years and, even after
Allen, the decisions concerned § 5's coverage as opposed to its merits. The
Attorney General's rulings and guidelines have had a significant deterrent
effect,"' but the section's future is, in important part, in judicial hands. The
recent Richmond decision, particularly as an interpretation of "purpose" in § 5,
does not augur well for the section's continued effectiveness. If "purpose" is to
mean belatedly discovered justification, straightforward and sympathetic exegesis
of § 5 is not to be expected.
There are, in the embryonic tradition of § 5 cases, other pivotal concepts
whose meanings are still unfolding. Court interpretations of these terms will
greatly affect the continued effectiveness of § 5. The Act forbids covered areas to
enact discriminatory "changes" in their election laws. Some courts have looked on
such "changes" as so closely tied with carry-over procedures that all have come
under scrutiny. If this view is developed, periodically required redistricting, as
111 Derfner, supra note 15, at 577-80.
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well as other "changes," will provide opportunity for doing away with dis-
criminatory procedures, no matter how lengthy their history.
An important criterion for judging discriminatory effect has been "dilution,"
but the meaning of this concept is no more settled than is the meaning of
"changes." The Court has offered constitutional guidance on testing redistricting
for discriminatory effect, but it has not yet offered a specific description of the
racially undiluted vote. Until such a firm standard is erected, § 5 examinations
of voting changes for the dilution which is a species of the proscribed discrimina-
tory effect will be unsettled. Beer proposes, at least within the context of a dis-
criminatory history that is also the common § 5 setting, a test which is specific
and demanding but, at least as a constitutional standard, perhaps too closely re-
sembles the proportional results criterion already rejected by the Court.
"Reconstruction enfranchisement reached its high point precisely 100 years
ago, yet its gains were obliterated quickly. While we are not likely to return to
an era of total disenfranchisement, we will not make lasting gains unless efforts
to eliminate vote dilution persevere." ' Section 5 is crucial to such efforts, but the
recent Richmond decision offers little judicial support. The upcoming Beer
opinion should indicate whether the Court will continue such restriction or give
full effect to § 5.
Win. J. Wernz
112 Id. at 583.
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